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Abstract The European economic model benefits from market forces as 
conditions for achieving goals of enterprises and consumers and economic 
efficiency is assured by necessary market infrastructure. Competition 
authorities are, without a doubt, one of the crucial pillars of the (social) 
market economy. The strength and impact of the competition rules is 
determined by their efficient implementation. The modest results to date of 
the competition policy in transitional economies militates in favor of an 
increase of the institutional capacity and require strengthening of the 
regulatory powers of public agencies in construction of an efficient 
economic system. Establishing a system of competitive markets through 
sectoral regulation, competition protection and state aid control at the 
national level requires a valid solution for a variety of legal, political and 
institutional conflicts. As the experience of the countries of South-East 
Europe has shown, many difficulties arising from the establishment of a 
functioning control system are procedural and relate to institutional 
building dilemmas. The purpose of this article is to shed  light on the 
requirements the Republic of Serbia has to satisfy in accession negotiations, 
and in particular, those related to building an efficient system of state aid 
control. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this article is to explain why institution building is a prerequisite for 
developing a workable competition protection regime in transition economies, notably in 
Serbia. The institutions, whose mission is to ensure the protection of competition, are 
critically important  to ensure an effective and efficient system of enforcement of 
competition rules, and as such are one of the crucial pillars of the (social) market 
economy. The modest results to date of the competition policy in transitional economies 
are driving the need for an increase in the institutional capacity and require strengthening 
of the regulatory powers of public agencies in the construction of an efficient economic 
system. Establishing a system of competitive markets through sectoral regulation, 
competition protection, and state aid control at the national level, requires well-grounded 
solutions for a variety of legal, political and institutional conflicts. The strength and 
impact of the competition rules is determined by their efficient implementation, and that 
is why the establishment of competition watchdogs is an important element of EU acquis 
conditionality towards accession countries. The purpose of this article is to shed light on 
the requirements the Republic of Serbia has to satisfy in accession negotiations, both 
regarding the general framework of competition law, and in particular the difficulties in 
establishing a functioning system of state aid control. 
 
The article starts with a general overview of the Social Market Economy as a concept and 
a model of the market system; its place in the founding acts of the EU; and, its ideological 
meaning. Essentially, the Social Market Economy as a concept implies  “workable” 
competition as the foundation of the economic order and reliance on the market 
mechanism which, as such, has to be protected by the authorities. In view of the fact that  
significant experience in development aid has shown that strengthening administrative 
capacities and institution building is the key determinant in transition economies, it is 
necessary to identify the main issues in the institutional design of competition authorities. 
Therefore, before explaining how the process of stabilisation and association, as well as 
accession negotiations, motivated Serbia to build more efficient institutions, it first is 
necessary to scrutinize the main elements of the institutional design of a competition 
authority. Several aspects of the governance of authority, internal organization and the 
relationship with stakeholders are briefly explored in order to explain the main 
dimensions where the institutional capacities of Serbian institutions need to be upgraded. 
In particular, sections five and six of the article explore, respectively, the development of 
competition protection by the Comission for the Protection of Competition and the 
Commission for State Aid Control. Whereas the strengthening of the authority of the 
Commission for the Protection of Competition is undisputable, the challenge which 
remains is how best to upgrade the Commission for State Aid Control. 
 
2 Social Market Economy and Competition Policy 
 
The Social Market Economy (German: Sociale Marktwirtschaft), whose origins trace to 
the Freiburg school of economic thought (Müller-Armack, 1978; Glossner, Gregosz, 
2011: 32), is a model of the market system which combines a free market capitalist 
economic system with social policies aiming to promote concepts of both fair competition 
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on the one hand and a welfare state on the other. This concept combines principles of 
liberalism and private enterpreneurship with state intervention through regulatory policy, 
in order to establish fair competition and to maintain a balance between economic growth, 
macro-economic policy prerogatives, public services and social welfare. Contrary to a 
free market economy model, under a Social Market Economy the state is not passive (i.e., 
laissez-faire) but instead actively implements regulatory tools in order to help ensure the 
framework of competitive markets (therefore it regulates to establish, protect and manage 
competition) and the performance of public services, among which services of general 
(economic) interest are crucial for the living standard and social welfare. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty, which went into force in December 2009, among other things, was 
meant to strengthen the social aspects of European integration. The wording of Article 3 
of the Treaty on European Union specified, as one of its objectives, to help promote “a 
highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress” (Damjanovic, 2013: 1685–1717). Centered on freedom of movement, over the 
years the integration has shifted towards deregulation and liberalization. However, the 
essence of the European economy should not be understood to focus just upon free and 
unfettered competition, but also on a competitive social market environment. 
Historically, the concept of “highly competitive social market economy” appeared for the 
first time in paragraph 3 of Article I-3 of the draft Constitutional Treaty.1 This expression 
was conceived as a compromise between the advocates of the free market ideology, and 
those who favored the European social model, and had as a primary aim the connection 
between the economic and the social goals of European integration, as well as the EU 
efforts to ensure greater coherence between economic and social policies.2 According to 
researchers, giving recognition to both social and economic interests, most likely was not 
intended to revert to the German economic policy after WWII. Instead, this phrase was 
borrowed as a possible compromise between the economic growth and competitiveness 
on the one hand, and the social-oriented redistributive measures on the other 
(Costamagna, 2011: 7). 
 
According to some authors, the evolution of the European Union (EU) towards greater 
consideration of the social aspects of economic development occurred at the time when 
the then European Economic Community (EEC) slowly began to expand to Eastern 
Europe. This expansionary period symbolically dated from the adoption of (not binding) 
the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers in December 1989, 
followed by amendments to the primary law approved especially in Maastricht and 
Amsterdam, until the beginning of the new millennium when this process culminated in 
the Article I- 3 of the draft Constitutional Treaty (Šmejkal, Šaroch, 2014: 395). After the 
failure of its ratification, the expression was copied to Article 3(3) of the TEU. 
 
This article of the TEU identifies seventeen goals, five of which could be described as 
market-oriented objectives: internal market; balanced economic growth and price 
stability; scientific and technological progress; and, the requirement that the social market 
economy (which already points to “market”) must be highly competitive. The other 
objectives are social and solidarity oriented, cultural and ecological. Articles 119–120 of 
the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU)3 proclaimed several other 
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goals (stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable 
balance of payments) and directly refer to the implementation of Article 3 of the Treaty 
on the European Union (TEU) by the EU and Member States. In laying down the basic 
principles, “an open market economy with free competition”, is mentioned three times. 
 
The social market economy, as a constitutional concept, is not as clear as other 
“objectives” or “goals” enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union. It lacks the 
explicit character, and instead represents a strategic approach towards the economic and 
social order. As such, it refers to market-compatible corrections of the free market, as 
opposed to a welfare state or a social union (Joerges, Roedl, 2004: 19). Contrary to this, 
the inclusion of the social market economy in the context of other social provisions of the 
Lisbon Treaty could eventually signify a limitation to further liberalization and 
deregulation measures within the internal market. This implies strengthening social rights 
on the one hand, while strengthening of the role of the State in fostering access to services 
of general interest, on the other. By way of example, the Treaty could include support 
measures which are not purely protectionist. In that sense, this Treaty “objective” of a 
social market economy could be interpreted as a potential defensive clause that should 
prevent the internal market from neoliberal tendencies. In short, the social market 
economy as a concept could be interpreted as a balancing of market freedom on the one 
hand and protected rights on the other. 
 
However, the EU Court of Justice neither relies on the social market economy goal as an 
argument, nor defines it in its judgment, notably in cases related to competition on the 
market.4 The European Commission is more transparent in this regard, and explains the 
purpose of Article 3 (3) TEU as an expression of the need for balance and sustainability 
of  Europe׳s own model, based on two complementary pillars: “on the one hand, the 
enforcement of competition, and on the other, social policy measures to guarantee social 
justice by correcting negative outcomes and bolster[ing] social protection.”5By allowing 
the entry of market forces into what were formerly State monopolies, the model of a 
social market economy expands the scope of interplay between the free market 
competition and the requirement for protection of those social rights, which should not 
be summoned to economic efficiency. The concept of a social market economy therefore 
could be explained as a means to achieve the sustainability of organised welfare; a new 
element of a “workable” competition; and, as the foundation of the economic order which 
provides protections both from restrictions imposed by market operators and state power 
(Crane, Howenkamp, 2013: 252–281). 
 
According to Monti, the term ‘social market economy’ “stands for reliance on the market 
mechanism. It is based on the experience that the market mechanism is the most efficient 
way to meet the demand from consumers for goods and services” (Monti, 2000: 2). In his 
speech, Monti further explained that Member states, by creating a single market in which 
the market forces are to yield a maximum of benefits to the European consumers, “ agreed 
on strong rules to protect the market forces against restriction and distortion by the 
Member states – e.g. by state aids - and by the economic operators themselves.” He 
further argued that the Treaty strikes a balance between benefits from market forces, and 
the goal of social cohesion, notably in the area of services of general interest. Such 
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services represent a key element in the European model of society and promote social 
cohesion, for which public authorities at the local, regional and national levels bear the 
responsibility. That is the basis for the authorities to establish a number of specific service 
provisions to meet these needs in the form of service of general interest obligations.  
 
The basic features of the impartial role of both the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
and the Treaty on the European Union is the neutrality with regard to the public or private 
ownership of companies and Member States’ freedom to define services of general 
interest. On the other side of the equation, restrictions of competition and limitations of 
the freedoms of the Single Market should not exceed what are necessary to guarantee the 
effective fulfillment of the mission. In certain situations, particularly when market forces 
alone do not result in a satisfactory provision of services, public authorities may entrust 
certain operators of services with obligations of general interest, and where necessary, 
grant them special or exclusive rights and/or devise a funding mechanism for their 
provision. It should be stressed, however, that the EU has still not agreed upon the manner 
on which to “integrate public policy considerations in competition decisions” and 
numerous exceptions could be inferred from the evolving case law (Monti, 2007: 112). 
 
3 The main issues in the institutional design of competition authorities 
 
In post-communist economies, the indispensable features on the agenda of priorities for 
development policies and the transformation process include the following: regulatory 
framework; institutional capacity; transparency; and, the competence and accountability 
of public administration, including the local level authorities (Hodgson, 1998). 
Experiences in development aid show that strengthening administrative capacities and 
institution building is the key determinant in transition economies (Graham, 2002: 97). 
One of the chief obstacles to developing a social market economy in Serbia is the lack of 
administrative capacity. The following description of the current state of affairs in the 
development of a Serbian institutional framework of competition authorities will explain 
why more independent institutions deliver better results. However, before a case study of 
Serbia is explained, it is worthwhile to first discuss the main issues in the institutional 
design of competition authorities. 
 
Transition countries have demanded guidance regarding the appropriate institutional 
design for the newly created competition institutions. The question of institutional 
independence is one of the key concerns. This apprehension is often voiced by foreign 
investors, who fear that competition authorities might be overly dependent on the national 
government or domestic dominant firms (Jenny, 2016: 2). As there are a growing number 
of examples, country experiences and variations, well-known competition specialists 
have prepared influential works regarding the design of competition authorities. A 
consensus has developed among these authorities that it is important for competition 
authorities to focus more attention on the relationship between the goals of competition 
law, agency effectivenes and their institutional design (Kovacic & Hyman 2012; Fox & 
Trebilcock, 2012). 
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It is difficult to define what “the institutional design of a competition authority” could 
mean, as there are many aspects of the governance of authority, internal organization and 
the relationship with stakeholders and the Government/Parliament. Therefore, a limited 
number of elements should be scrutinized as the basis for establishing the agenda for 
creation or upgrade of institutional capacities of bodies in charge of competition and state 
aid control. In this sense, the most relevant findings, based on reports by national 
authorities, are collected within the works of the OECD Competition Committee 
Roundtable on institutional design, and other OECD roundtables dedicated to the 
institutional features of competition authorities.  
 
The institutional design of competition authorities may be grouped under three main 
themes: the goals of competition authorities; the functions of competition authorities; 
and, the organization of competition authorities (Jenny, 2016: 3). In 2003, the OECD 
observed that “the basic objectives of competition authorities were to maintain and 
encourage the process of competition in order to promote efficient use of resources while 
protecting the freedom of economic action of various market participants”. The OECD 
Global forum on competition noted that it is vital for competition policy  to achieve or 
preserve a number of other objectives as well including: pluralism; decentralization of 
economic decision-making; prevention of abuses of economic power; promotion of small 
business; fairness and equity; and, other socio-political values.6 
 
The second dimension of institutional design centers upon the question of the functions 
of competition authorities: namely, competition enforcement and consumer protection. 
Reports show that nearly half of the competition authorities of the OECD countries have 
consumer and competition law enforcement functions whereas the other half do 
not.7However, the function of competition authorities could be extended to state aid, 
sector specific regulation. This diverse vision of goals may, however, deliver negative 
effects and undermine the primary goals of competition policy. 
 
A third element of institutional design relates to the organization of the competition 
authority, notably its competences and independence. Within the category of 
competences or assigned functions, one of the most important issues is the nature of its 
powers: prosecutorial agencies or administrative models, investigation versus 
adjudication. An emerging issue for transition economies is to ensure the independence 
and management of independent competition authorities.  
 
As it is difficult to detect departure from an economically justified interpretation of 
competition laws, it is particularly important to protect competition authorities from the 
risk of capture by the executive branch of government or by business interests. Thus, a 
more independent competition authority should help guarantee not only a better quality 
of decisions but also the implementation of competition law more in line with economic 
analysis and legal principles, limiting the risk that illegitimate goals will influence the 
decision making process (Jenny, 2016: 29). 
 
As Philip Lowe, the former Director General of the Directorate- General for Competition 
stated in 2008 “In order to fulfil their role effectively (competition policy) institutions 
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must constantly assess and reassess their mission, objectives, structures, processes and 
performances. It is only through realizing and adapting to changes in their environment 
and through carrying out the corresponding improvement that their competences, powers, 
budget and ultimately existence can be justified before a wider public” (Lowe, 2008: 11). 
 
4 European Integration process as an impetus for a competition protection 
institutions in Serbia 
 
Since democratic changes started in the early 2000’s, and after a long and still ongoing 
process of transition to a market economy, the Serbian government strives to pursue 
fiscal, structural and regulatory reforms under an IMF program that runs to 2018.8 The 
Serbian road to the EU started in November 2000, when a “Framework Agreement 
between the EU and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)” was signed, enabling 
the EU assistance to political and economic reforms. The Stabilization and Association 
Agreement between the EU and Serbia was signed in April 2008.9 On December 22, 
2009, Serbia applied for European Union membership. In March 2012, Serbia was 
granted a candidate status for EU membership. On June 28, 2013, The Council of the 
European Union decided to open accession negotiations with Serbia.10As a candidate 
country, Serbia has to adjust its system of macro-economic governance in line with the 
requirements set out by the EU. Namely, the Enlargement Strategy of the European 
Commission suggested for the first time the creation of the European Semester Light, 
fostering the system of national economic planning in order to assist Western Balkan 
states with tackling economic reforms; restructuring their economies; and, stimulating 
growth and employment from the early stages of the accession negotiations. Therefore, 
Serbia, as well as other Western Balkan countries, is exposed to a double conditionality: 
democratic and acquis conditionality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). 
 
For more than a decade, the reforms in Serbia were guided by neo-liberal doctrine and 
fostered by conditionality imposed primarily through international financial institutions 
such as the IMF. Privatization, liberalization and deregulation were the main pillars of 
the reforms, followed blindly by politicians who have made a great number of ill-advised 
decisions in setting transitional goals. After more than two decades of transition, a 
partocracy still dominates in assets, and the inefficiencies of the public sector of the 
economy have accumulated a large structural deficit which have led to massive public 
debt. Drafted on the basis of the Guideline on National Reform Programs issued by the 
European Commission, Serbia’s Economic Reform Program (a three-year planning 
document), among other issues, focuses on steps that need to be taken to ensure the 
completion of the privatization and restructuring of the public companies; the reduction 
of the state’s share in the economy; and, the strengthening of competition. In sum, 
institutional building of the competition authorities is crucial for speeding up economic 
growth and progress. 
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5 Building the capacity of the Serbian Commission for Protection of 
Competition 
 
Less than four years following the enactment of the first Law on Protection of 
Competition  in Serbia,11 a second law regulating the same subject matter has been 
enacted,12and was amended in 2013.13 The independent competition authority first 
formed under the old law, the Commission for Protection of Competition 
(“Commission“) made huge gains politically and morally, in a business culture based 
primarily on collaboration rather than competition (Jovanić & Milutinović, 2010: 79–
106). 
 
The first Anti-monopoly Commission was established pursuant to this Law in 1999. 
Practically speaking, the implementation of this law had been postponed until the  Anti-
monopoly Commission was established. The Anti-monopoly Commission was 
established as an administrative body of a collective nature, attached to the Federal 
Ministry for Internal Trade of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The President 
and six members were subject to both appointment and dismissal by the Federal 
Government. Therefore, the Anti-monopoly Commission was not considered to be an 
independent and autonomous entity but, rather,  an administrative organ of the State 
administration. The Anti-monopoly Commission also included a Technical Service and 
was entrusted,  among other things, with issuing decisions regarding the abuse of 
monopolistic and dominant positions and the  evaluation of the existence of  monopolistic 
agreements. Overall, due to many unsolved material issues and procedural difficulties, 
the first Anti-monopoly Commission was practically inoperable. It ceased its activities 
on February 4, 2003, when the Constitutional Charter of State Union Serbia and 
Montenegro came into force. However, it continued to exist as the state administrative 
body of the Republic of Serbia and its Technical Service was taken over by the Ministry 
of Trade, Tourism and Services of the Republic of Serbia, and it is within that structure 
that it continued to operate as the Anti-monopoly Department.  
 
The Law on Protection of Competition of 2005 established the Commission for 
Protection of Competition (“Commission”) as an independent and autonomous legal 
entity entrusted with public competencies, accountable to the National Assembly. The 
Commission was established in April 2006, upon the election of the President and Vice-
President of the Council of the Commission for Protection of Competition, as its decision-
making body. Initially, the operating staff of the new Commission was comprised mainly 
of members from the old Anti-monopoly Department of the Ministry of Trade, Services 
and Tourism. 
 
As emphasized in Article 20 of the new Law on the Protection of Competition, the 
Commission for Protection of Competition has the status of a legal entity and was 
established as an “independent and autonomous organization entrusted with public 
powers”.14However, the institutional capacity of a regulatory body should  be judged not 
only through the prism of its independence, but also by its responsibility; and not only by 
those institutions to whom it is responsible by law, but also by consumers, market and 
the society as a whole. The Commission is accountable to the National Assembly. The 
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primary instrument establishing its accountability is its annual report of activities 
submitted to the Assembly. 
 
The Commission is comprised of decision making bodies and the Experts’ Service 
charged with professional activities. Its internal organization and operational rules are set 
forth in its Articles of Association, which are rendered upon prior consent of the 
Government. Decision making bodies of the Commission are the Council of the 
Commission and the President. The Council, which consists of the President of the 
Commission and four members, is a major decision-making body, authorised to render 
all the decisions for which the Commission is competent. Contrary to the former Law on 
the Protection of Competition, which stipulated that the Council should make a decision 
on the basis of the majority votes of the present members, if at least three members were 
present, the new Law stipulates in Article 25(1) that the Council shall render the decision 
by the majority of votes of the total number of its members.  
 
Members of the Council are elected from among prominent lawyers and economists. A 
Council member must fulfill certain requirements ad personam, pertinent to performing 
public service. Personal independence is one of the components of the institutional 
independence which stems from political independence. Of paramount concern is the 
independence of the managing bodies of the regulatory agency. Guarantees of personal 
independence are clear criteria for appointment and dismissal of the members of the 
managing body.  Council members, including the President, are appointed for a period of 
five years, with the possibility of reappointment.  Strict conditions for the appointment 
and dismissal of the President and members of the managing bodies of the regulatory 
agency  help to insure their personal independence. The mandate of the Council member 
terminates by expiry of the term for which he was appointed; relief of the duty due to the 
reasons stipulated by the Law; or, the existence of legal or factual reasons which make 
him unable to perform his duties. Further, the Council of the Commission and/or the 
National Assembly may relieve the member of the Council from the office in stipulated 
cases, namely those commonly present in the comparative law.15 The reasons for 
termination of the mandate of the President of Commission and the Council Members are 
clearly stipulated in the Law on the Protection of Competition, and include all legal or 
factual reasons for inability to perform duties, such as resignation, statutory retirement 
age, serious health conditions, etc. A member of the Council may be dismissed by the 
National Assembly should it be reasonably determined that information in the candidacy 
was inaccurate, incomplete or could have in any way reduced the possibility of the 
member being elected; in cases where a gross violation of the Law or Code of Ethics is 
established; when a conflict of interest  is established; and, when a member of the Council 
was actively engaged in affairs of a political party or performed other functions or 
professional activities for profit, including consulting and advisory services, etc. To 
conclude, personal independence cannot be limited to competence to elect Commission’s 
management, but that it is primarily linked to guarantees of the continuity of the 
performance of their activities.  
 
Funding for the operation of the Commission  is derived in numerous ways including fees 
charged for its administrative acts, donations and income realized by sale of its 
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publications. The amount of fees paid to the Commission is determined by the 
Commission’s regulation on Tariff,16 which may come into force only upon prior consent 
of the Government. Financial activities and financial statements of the Commission are 
subject to audit by the State Audit Institution. If the annual financial statement shows that 
total realised income of the Commission exceeds total expenditures, the residual funds 
shall be transferred into the budget of the Republic of Serbia. Conversely, should the 
income be insufficient and the regular activities of the Commission jeopardized, the Law 
has foreseen the possibility of allocating funds from the budget of the Republic of Serbia 
(Article 32). 
 
The Commission does not consider itself as a “regulatory body” such as agencies 
established to regulate telecommunications, the energy sector and the other public 
utilities. These agencies address irregularities in the functioning of the market caused by 
lack of competition and apply regulatory measures (e.g. price controls, conditions of 
performing business, licensing etc). The Commission independently monitors all these 
sectors and the overall market, with the main goal being to preserve and strengthen 
competition. Accordingly, its activities may overlap with the activities of regulatory 
agencies. As an instance of  last resort, the Commission shall take necessary action when 
a regulatory agency fails to implement the measures from its competence, by  sanctioning 
the behaviour of market participants that inhibits the competition in the regulated sectors. 
 
During the last few years, the trend of agencification has stimulated the establishment of 
agencies as quasi-administrative bodies in the domain of Serbian governance structure 
(Milenkovic & Milenkovic, 2013). These agencies, established under various laws, differ 
among themselves in terms of their status and organisation. By enacting the Law on 
Public Agencies in 2006, the legislator has attempted to create a unifying framework for 
these quasi-administrative subjects which perform developmental, professional and 
regulatory tasks of a general interest.  While the establishment of an agency is proposed 
by the ministry or the ministries in whose domain the operations to be transferred to the 
agency lie, the government exercises the rights of the founder in the name of the Republic 
of Serbia. Agencies are not considered to be organs of the state administration, but instead 
“organizations which perform public interest activities” (Law on Public Agencies, article 
1). The supervision of the execution of conferred administrative authorities is exercised 
by the ministry into which field of competences those authorities belong, while their 
financial operations are  supervised by the Ministry of Finance.  
 
Both the Commission for the Protection of Competition and the Securities Commission 
are established by law as independent and autonomous entities, like the National Bank of 
Serbia (’NBS’). The status of the NBS, as the central bank, is, in principle, higher than 
that of other organisations, as its existence is guaranteed by the Constitution, which, in 
its Article 95, provides that the NBS is independent and subject to the control of the 
National Assembly. Although they do not enjoy the NBS's “constitutional status as 
“organisations“ both the Securities Commission and the Commission for Protection of 
Competition are not administrative organisations which belong to the classic 
administrative apparatus, nor are they public agencies. As the Law on Public agencies is 
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not directly applicable to them, it seems that these two Commissions are in a vacuum 
between public agencies and the NBS, as an independent state entity. 
 
Finally, regarding the relationship between the Commission and other agencies and 
autonomous entities, the new LPC introduced, in its Article 49, new rules for cooperation 
between the Commission and other “public authorities.” All other public authorities, 
whether state or local, must respond to a request for information from the Commission. 
If they fail to comply, the Commission has the right to report the non-compliance to the 
public authority’s supervising body (usually a Government Ministry in the case of 
agencies). If failure to comply persists, the Commission ultimately has the right to publish 
information regarding such non-compliance. The legislator thus stopped short of 
providing outright legal sanctions for failure to cooperate with the Commission but 
sought, instead, to make non-cooperation a public issue and something that the 
responsible public authority is called upon to justify in the eyes of the public and of the 
state apparatus.  
 
6 Challenges of reforming the institutional framework of state aid control 
 
The Serbian government adopted the Plan for the Implementation of Priorities Contained 
in the European Partnership in 2006. The adoption of a law on control of State aid was 
one of its priorities. State aid, together with the competition law related issues, was one 
of the most important  issues considered during the negotiation of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA)and of the accession process. Further, in the text it will be 
explained why the system of state aid prevented opening of the Chapter 8 in accession 
negotiations. 
 
Serbia's first-ever Law on the Control of State Aid came into force on January 1, 2010.17 
It was, again, a result of a conditionality of acquis harmonization, as one feature of the 
national systems of state aid control which appeared throughout the 1990’s in the 
European countries that had applied for membership in the European Union. For Serbia 
and other Western Balkan countries, the requirements for establishing the system of state 
aid control were stipulated in the SAA. As Cremona (Cremona, 2003) rightly points out, 
this agreement is the main instrument through which the European Union seeks to ensure 
acceptance of the rules of the common market from the countries that are potential 
candidates for membership. Establishing a system of state aid control at the national level 
presupposes a number of  legal, political and institutional conflicts. Experience of the 
CEE countries shows that many difficulties arising from the establishment of a 
functioning control system are procedural in their nature (Atanasiu, 2001: 263, cited in 
Milenkovic, 2016: 36). 
 
By signing the SAA, Serbia accepted the institution-building for state aid assistance and 
a duty to develop a functioning system of state aid control in line with Article 73 of the 
SAA (“Competition and other economic provisions”). According to the SAA, the parties 
shall ensure that an operationally independent authority is entrusted with the powers 
necessary for the full application of paragraph 1(i) and (ii) of this Article, regarding 
private and public undertakings and undertakings to which special rights have been 
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granted. It is also envisaged for Serbia to establish an operationally independent authority 
which is entrusted with the powers necessary for the full application of paragraph 1(iii) 
within one year from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. This authority shall 
have, among other things, the powers to authorize State aid schemes and individual aid 
grants in conformity with paragraph 2, as well as the powers to order the recovery of State 
aid that has been unlawfully granted. 
 
The Community, on the onehand, and Serbia, on the other, shall ensure transparency in 
the area of State aid, among other things, by providing to the other parties a regular annual 
report, or the equivalent, following the methodology and the presentation of the 
Community survey on State aid. Upon request by one party, the other party shall provide 
information on particular individual cases of public aid. Serbia shall also, according to 
SAA, establish a comprehensive inventory of aid schemes instituted before the 
establishment of the authority and shall align such aid schemes with the EU criteria within 
a period of no more than 4 years from the entry into force of that Agreement. 
  
The requirement to develop an “operationally independent” body leaves open the option 
to a prospective member state to adjust the setting to its respective administrative systems 
and traditions. On the other hand, the standard of “operational independence” is not 
defined by law but rather is being gradually interpreted by the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2014). 
 
In its Screening Report of November 2015, the European Commission, assessing the 
alignment and implementing capacity, has stressed that a key challenge for Serbia will be 
to strengthen its administrative capacity and to develop a solid enforcement record, in 
particular in the area of State aid (European Commission, 2015: 10). 
 
”Overall, Serbia has broadly aligned its national legislation with the EU acquis 
on antitrust and merger. Serbia's legislation in the area of State aid is only partially 
aligned. A key challenge for Serbia will be to strengthen its administrative capacity and 
to build up a solid enforcement record, in particular in the area of State aid.” ...„The 
capacity and enforcement record of the CSAC [Commission for State Aid Control] and 
its Department are largely insufficient. The CSAC urgently needs further qualified staff, 
in order to establish a good enforcement record. The CSAC cannot be considered as an 
operationally independent authority within the meaning of Article 73(4) of the SAA, since 
most of its members are nominated by aid granting ministries, and since the Department 
for State Aid Control, which assists the CSAC in investigating State aid and preparing 
decisions, is part of the Ministry of Finance. The knowledge of civil servants and 
administrative staff employed in other ministries and aid granting bodies dealing with 
State aid issues is not sufficient and needs to be strengthened”…”The Commission notes 
that a certain number of aid measures are not notified to, and approved by the CSAC 
before being granted. Serbia needs to urgently improve its enforcement record in the field 
of State aid.“(European Commission, 2015: 10 and 14) 
 
The Commission has defined six benchmarks, all of them related to the State Aid, to be 
addressed before the negotiations of the chapter 8 are opened, particularly in order for 
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Serbia to ensure “that the State aid authority is operationally independent and that it has 
the powers and the resources necessary for the full and proper application of State aid 
rules.”(European Commission, 2015: 15) 
Therefore, the European Commission expects Serbia to make significant progress in 
aligning its legislation on state aid control with the acquis and to make the Commission 
for State Aid Control more independent and effective. 
 
Building a system of state aid control requires the implementation of several steps. The 
first is to establish an inventory in terms of internal evaluation of everything that the 
government makes at various government levels. The next is to create a monitoring 
system to oversee the changes in the coming years relating to the basic inventory. The 
third step requires mapping in the sense of determining the level of development of 
regions, which should provide that the maximum amounts of certain types of state aid 
will be approved only to certain parts of the country. The final step involves the 
introduction of national measures of state aid control in accordance with the EU 
principles and acquis into national structures (Stojanović, Stanišić, Radivojević, 2013: 
169). 
 
There are two aspects to consider when evaluating the results Serbia has achieved in the 
establishment and implementation of the system of state aid control. One is institutional, 
in the sense of providing the necessary legal framework and capacity for the 
implementation of the law on state aid control. The other aspect is practical, in terms of 
analysis of effects that implementation of the law and the work of the Commission of 
state aid control have. While Serbia's progress in institutional terms is self-evident, the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of state aid control in  practice may be undertaken both 
through a comparative analysis of the granted state aid in Serbia towards the EU, in 
absolute terms, and also by comparison of the objectives of granting state aid. The 
authority that controls State aid must be independent in order to be able to make objective 
decisions authorizing aid schemes and executing their applications. Particularly, this 
means that “the authority cannot be dependent upon the organs of administration engaged 
in the granting process, nor upon the beneficiaries of State aid.” (European Commission, 
2015: 15) 
 
The members of the Commission for State aid control were appointed in December 2009 
according to the Law by a Decision of the Government. By virtue of the law, no aid may 
be granted without a prior decision by the Commission. Serbian legislators opted for a 
hybrid solution by forming an independent commission entrusted with control tasks, but 
without a separate budget or administrative capacity. This body was entrusted with 
controlling State aid measures until Serbia's prospective accession to the European 
Union, when this obligation will cease to exist, and the power to scrutinize State aid 
measures will be transferred to the European Commission. However, this approach has 
demonstrated some weaknesses to which European Commission Reports have pointed as 
outlined above. 
 
The Commission has no separate legal personality, and no budget or separate 
administrative capacities, but rather, is served by the Ministry of Finance (Department 
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for State Aid). Members of the Commission are proposed by relevant ministries, with one 
member from the Commission for Protection of Competition, appointed for a five-year 
period pursuant to the decision of the government. This institutional design makes the 
Commission too dependent on the Ministry of Finance.Other State aid grantors evidently 
weakened the standard of operational independence as outlined above (Milenkovic, 2016: 
36–37).The Commission has five members and is established by the Government.18 The 
Commission is charged with adopting its rules of procedure and is explicitly defined as 
“operationally independent”. The Commission has no separate budget; rather,  the Law 
prescribes that funds for the activities of the Commission shall be provided from the 
budget of the Republic of Serbia, and that the Ministry of Finance provides the premises 
and other technical requirements for the activities of the Commission.The current 
secretariat is based in the Ministry of Finance within the Department for State Aid. 
 
In 2000, Slovenia had established  the Commission for State Aid Control, by  virtue of 
the same legal act the State aid control section was established, to conduct “specialist, 
administrative and technical tasks for the Commission” within Ministry of 
finance/economy (Jagodic Lakocevic, Pelka, Vosu, 2004). Due to the close cooperation 
between colleagues from Serbian and Slovenian ministries of Finance, this model had 
been used for composition of Serbian CSAS. Upon entry into the EU, the Commission 
ceased to exist and remaining national competences were transferred to the Ministry of 
finance. 
 
The benchmark of the screening report requires a reform of the institutional status of the 
Commission, which may go in two directions: strengthening of the institutional capacity 
of the Commission, or the merger with/aquisition by the Competition Commission. In the 
first case, some legislative changes would have to be introduced, such as gaining a distinct 
legal personality; having a separate budget; having personal independence guarantees; 
and, adding more administrative staff.  Limiting factors, however, are the austerity policy 
and fiscal stance, which, along with other limiting factors, assume the reduction in the 
number of civil servants. In the second case, financial concerns would be solved as the 
Competition Commission has financial independence, along with a record of 
independence. Experienced staff could join the special department or sector of the 
Competition Commission. Although at first blush this looks like an appealing solution, 
on closer examination there are practical difficulties of integrating those functions within 
an agency.  For example, there is the potential for one mission to dominate the other to 
the detriment of both; a lack of clarity of purpose of the agency, resulting in diminished 
support for the agency’s overall mission; and, the potential for “destructive rivalry” 
between the competing missions within an agency for prestige, headcount, and budgetary 
resources (Kovacic & Hyman, 2013: 38). 
 
Apart from the above two models, a rare institutional solution may be adopted. Namely, 
Slovakia and Cyprus created the bodies with the great extent of independence and in 
charge solely with state aid control. Slovakia established the Office for State Aid in 
199919 which was a separate agency for state aid control. In Cyprus, a specific model of 
state aid control was introduced during the EU integration process in 2001 and the body 
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entrusted with the tasks of controlling state aid measures was the Office of the 
Commissioner for Public Aid.20 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
Competition authorities are, without a doubt, one of the crucial pillars of the (social) 
market economy. The strength and impact of the competition rules is determined by their 
efficient implementation. That is why the building of competition watchdogs is an 
element of EU acquis conditionality towards accession countries. 
 
Establishing a system of competitive markets through sectoral regulation, competition 
protection and state aid control at the national level, requires a valid solution for a variety 
of legal, political and institutional conflicts. As the experience of the countries of South-
East Europe has shown, many difficulties arising from the establishment of a functioning 
control system are procedural and relate to institutional building dilemmas. The purpose 
of this article was to give some historical overview of the creation of competition 
protection institutions and the requirements the Republic of Serbia has to satisfy in 
accession negotiations, in particular those related to building an efficient system of state 
aid control. 
 
The development of the system of state aid control, as the field of competition policy, is 
an important segment of the pre-accession commitments of the countries in the process 
of integration into the European Union. The obligation of building a system for the 
Western Balkan countries was created by signing the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement. The comparative legal analysis showed that there is an inverse correlation 
between the level of development of the system of state aid control and the potential time 
required to obtain the status of a full member of the European Union (Milenkovic, 2016). 
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Notes 
 
1Official Journal of the European Union C 310 Vol 47, December 10, 2004. 
2Final Report of Working Group XI on Social Europe CONV 516/1/03, Brussels, 4 February 2003, 
p. 12.  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs_all/committees/conv/20030206/cv00516-r1.en03.pdf 
3Title VIII TFEU “Economic and monetary policy”. 
4 For an overview see: Šmejkal (2015). 
5Andor, L., Building a social market economy in the European Union. EU Commissioner 
responsible for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, speech 11/695, 2011. Manchester, 
20th October. 
6OECD Global Forum on Competition 2003, Session I “ The objectives of Competition Law and 
Policy, available at www.oecd.org/competition/globalforum/GlobalForum-February2003.pdf; 
Note by the Secretariat, The objectives of Competition Law and Policy, OECD Global Forum on 
Competition 2003, available at www.oecd.org/competition/globalforum/GlobalForum-
February2003.pdf 
7Note by Allan Fels and Henry Ergas, Institutional Design of Competition Authorities, OECD 
Competition Committee, 17-18 December 2014, Doc DAF/COMP/WD(2014)85, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/changes-in-competition-institutional-design.htm 
8GDP Annual Growth Rate in Serbia averaged 2.81 percent from 1997 until 2016. 
9The Agreement entered into force on 1 September 2013. Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
between the European Communities and Their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of 
Serbia, of the other part ("Official Gazette of RS-International Agreements", No. 83/2008) signed 
on 29.4.2008. 
10The First Intergovernmental Conference took place on 21 January 2014. 
11Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 79/05. The old LPC was the first EU-style 
competition law in Serbia. Prior to that, there was the Antimonopoly Law of 1996, which was 
flanked by isolated provisions in the Law on Obligations of 1978, the Yugoslav Constitution of 
1992 and the Serbian Constitution of 1990, which prohibited the creation of 
monopolies/monopolistic positions. 
12Law on Protection of Competition (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 51/09 
13Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 95/13. 
14Law on Protection of Competition, Article 20(1). 
15Law on Protection of Competition, Article 24(4). 
16Tariff on the level of fees for activities within the competency of Commission for Protection of 
Competition, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 49/2011. 
17Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No 51/09. 
18Its members are elected by the Government upon the proposals of: the ministry responsible for 
finances; the ministry responsible for the economy and regional development; the ministry 
responsible for infrastructure; the ministry responsible for environmental protection; and the 
Commission for the Protection of Competition. The representative of the ministry responsible for 
finances is, at the same time, the Chairperson of the Commission, and the representative of the 
Commission for the Protection of Competition is the Deputy Chairperson. 
19Law No.231/1999. 
20Public Aid Control Law (Law 30(Ι)/2001), www.publicaid.gov.cy/ 
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